Structural decline in China's CO2 emissions through transitions in industry and energy systems by Guan, Dabo et al.
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Structural decline in China's CO2 emissions through transitions in 
industry and energy systems 
 
Dabo Guan1,2,*, Jing Meng2,3,*, David M. Reiner4, Ning Zhang5, Yuli Shan2, Zhifu Mi6, Shuai 
Shao7, Zhu Liu1,8, Qiang Zhang1 and Steven J. Davis9 
 
 
1 Department of Earth System Science, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 150080, China 
2 Water Security Research Centre, School of International Development, University of East 
Anglia, Norwich NR4 7JT, UK 
3 Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB3 
9DT, UK 
4 Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1AG UK 
5 College of Economics, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China 
6 The Bartlett School of Construction and Project Management, University College London, 
WC1E 7HB, London, UK 
7 School of Urban and Regional Science, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, 
Shanghai 200433, China 
8 Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, School of International Development, 
University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7JT, UK 
9 Department of Earth System Science, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, California 
92697, USA 
 
 
 
 
* These authors contributed equally to this work. 
2 
 
 
1 As part of the Paris Agreement, China pledged to peak its CO2 emissions by 2030. In 
2 retrospect, the commitment may have been fulfilled as it was being made: China’s 
3 emissions peaked in 2013 at a level of 9.53 Gigatons of CO2, and declined in each year 
4 from 2014 to 2016. However, the prospect for maintenance of the continued reductions 
5 depend the relative contributions of different changes in China. Here we quantitatively 
6 evaluate the drivers of the peak and decline of China’s CO2 emissions between 2007 and 
7 2016 using the latest available energy, economic, and industry data. We find that 
8 slowing economic growth in China has it easier to reduce emissions. Nevertheless, the 
9 decline is largely associated with changes in industrial structure and a decline in the 
10 share of coal used for energy. Decreasing energy intensity (energy per unit GDP) and 
11 emissions intensity (emissions per unit energy) also contributed to the decline. Based on 
12 an econometric (cumulative sum) test, we confirm that there is a clear structural break 
13 in China’s emission pattern from 2015. We conclude that the decline of Chinese 
14 emissions is structural and is likely to be sustained if the nascent industrial and energy 
15 system transitions continue. 
16 
17 
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18 China is the top CO2-emitting nation, with emissions making up nearly a third (29.5%) of 
19 the global total in 2015 1. For this reason, international efforts to stabilize the Earth’s climate 
20 depend heavily upon the trajectory of Chinese emissions, and the country’s recent pledge to 
21 reduce its annual emissions before 2030 has been widely celebrated 2,3. Now, it is becoming 
22 clear that China may have already fulfilled this commitment: estimates made by various 
23 organizations indicate that—after more than decade of rapid growth—China’s annual CO2 
24 emissions have decreased year-on-year over the period 2013-2016. 
25 Although undoubtedly a watershed event, the peak of Chinese emissions prompts 
26 important questions about what factors are driving the current decrease, their relative 
27 importance, and whether or not the decline can be sustained or even accelerated. In particular, 
28 if China’s emissions are have fallen primarily as a result of slowing economic activity, as 
29 happened in the U.S. during the global financial crisis 4, renewed economic growth could 
30 reverse the decrease 5,6. 
31 Here, we assess the drivers of Chinese emissions from 2007-2016. Details of the analytical 
32 approach and data sources are provided in the Methods section below and Supplementary 
33 Information (SI). In summary, we update emissions inventories for China for 2000-2016 
34 using the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) sectoral approach 7 and the 
35 most recently published and revised statistics from Chinese government Yearbooks. This was 
36 necessary to ensure consistency and sufficient sectoral detail, and because the underlying 
37 Chinese data has been repeatedly updated and revised. We use Index Decomposition Analysis 
38 (IDA) to quantitatively evaluate the relative influence of eight socioeconomic factors on 
39 China’s energy-related emissions. We then perform a cumulative sum test to investigate 
40 whether there has been any structural change in China’s recent emissions patterns. 
41 Trends in China’s emissions, energy consumption and economic activity. The red curve 
42 in Fig.1a shows our estimates of Chinese emissions from 2000-2016, with other curves 
43 exhibiting similar emissions similar trends from five other prominent sources for comparison 
44 (see Methods for a more detailed comparison). China’s emissions grew at an average annual 
45 rate of 9.3% between 2000 and 2013, from ~3.0 Gt in 2000 to a peak of 9.5 Gt CO2 in 2013 
46 (Fig. 1a). Emissions then declined by 1.0%, 1.8% and 0.4% in 2014, 2015 and 2016, 
47 respectively, reaching 9.2 Gt CO2 in 2016 (8.5 Gt from fossil fuel combustion and 0.7 Gt 
48 from industrial processes). 
49 Fig.1b shows contemporaneous trends in China’s economic growth (green curve) and 
50 carbon intensity (purple curve): GDP growth has been rapid and monotonic, outpacing the 
51 growth of CO2 emissions since 2007. As a result, the carbon intensity of the Chinese economy 
52 declined by 27% between 2000-2016 (Fig. 1b). As we will show, such decreases in emissions 
53 intensity hint at the underlying changes in China’s industrial structure and energy efficiency. 
54 Meanwhile, Figure 1C shows that China’s energy consumption has continued to increase over 
55 the same period, but at a decelerated rate after 2011. Moreover, energy from fossil fuels 
56 (areas shaded red, orange and yellow in Fig. 1c) has been essentially flat since emissions 
57 peaked in 2013, and the increase in total consumption 2014-2016 has been met by non-fossil 
58 sources (green shading in Fig. 1c). 
59 Based on our decomposition analysis, Fig. 2 shows the relative and absolute contribution 
60 of each of eight socioeconomic factors on Chinese energy-related CO2 emissions: (1) 
61 population growth (dark blue); (2) economic growth (green); changes in the shares of Chinese 
62 energy supplied by (3) coal (light blue), (4) natural gas (yellow), and (5) oil (purple); (6) 
63 changes in the quality of fossil fuels burned (i.e. fuel-specific changes in CO2 emissions per 
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64 unit energy; orange); (7) changes in energy intensity (i.e. energy consumed per unit of GDP; 
65 red); and (8) changes in industrial structure (i.e. the relative contributions of different types of 
66 industry to GDP). In order to facilitate presentation and discussion, we subdivide the results 
67 from 2007-2016 into three 3-year periods. 
68 Growing emissions 2007-2010 and 2010-2013. Between 2007 and 2013, the 40.9% 
69 increase in Chinese emissions was dominated by strong economic growth (Fig. 2, green bars), 
70 which—in the absence of other factors—would have caused emissions to increase by 29.3% 
71 and 24.6% during the periods 2007-2010 and 2010-2013, respectively. The next most 
72 important driver of increasing emissions during this time frame was the increasing quality of 
73 fuels, and particularly coal, being burned in China (Fig. 2, orange bars). Higher quality coal 
74 (i.e., anthracite) contains greater carbon by mass, which results in more CO2 emissions per ton 
75 of fuel burned than does lower quality coal (i.e., brown coal) 7. Independent of other factors, 
76 changes in fuel quality led to emissions increases of 12.5% and 5.4% during the periods 2007- 
77 2010 and 2010-2013, respectively. Population growth also pushed Chinese emissions upward 
78 steadily during these time periods, by 1.6% in both 2007-2010 and 2010-2013 (Fig. 2, blue 
79 bars). Changes in the share of energy provided by oil and natural gas also caused small 
80 increases in emissions 2007-2010 and 2010-2013, respectively (Fig. 2, purple and yellow 
81 bars). 
82 During 2007-2013, when total Chinese emissions were increasing, several factors also 
83 acted to decrease emissions, effectively restraining the growth rate. Between 2007-2010, the 
84 most important of these was changes in energy intensity (energy consumed per unit GDP), 
85 which—in the absence of other factors—would have caused emissions to decrease by 15.4% 
86 (Fig. 2, red bars). Although changing energy intensity continued to suppress emissions growth 
87 between 2010 and 2013, its influence during those years waned substantially, to a 3.2% 
88 decrease. Conversely, changes in China’s industrial structure accounted for only a modest 
89 decreasing force 2007-2010 (1.1%), but gained strength over the period 2010-2013, when it 
90 drove emissions down by 7.3% (Fig. 2, pink bars). Decreases in the share of China’s energy 
91 derived from coal also acted to reduce emissions by 6.2% and 1.1% during the periods 2007- 
92 2010 and 2010-2013, respectively (Fig. 2, light blue bars). Similar changes in the share of 
93 energy provided by natural gas and oil were responsible for small declines in emissions over 
94 2007-2010 and 2010-2013, respectively (Fig. 2, yellow and purple bars). 
95 Decreasing emissions 2013-2016. Chinese CO2 emissions have declined since 2013 and a 
96 cumulative sum (cusum) test indicates that this decline is a structural change (Fig.1d and 
97 Supplementary Table 3). We examined the energy related industrial emissions from 2000 to 
98 2016. Although the emissions show turning points around both 2008 and 2013, the cusum test 
99 suggests that only the change from 2015 (at 95% condifence intervel) is structurally 
100 significant. This evidence of structural change reflects changes in the driving forces during 
101 2013-2016 having a more significant impact on the change in industrial CO2 emissions than 
102 that in other periods. Between 2013 and 2016, the 4.2% decrease in Chinese emissions was 
103 driven by the combination of changes in industrial structure, and further decreases in both the 
104 share of energy derived from coal and the energy intensity of China’s economy (Fig. 2, pink, 
105 light blue, and red bars, respectively). In the absence of other factors, these three factors 
106 would have caused emissions over 2013-2016 to decrease by 10.0%, 7.8%, and 5.1%, 
107 respectively (22.9% in total). In addition, Chinese economic growth 2013-2016 was 
108 somewhat slower than in the previous analyzed periods, driving emissions up by 18.2% (6.4% 
109 less than in the period 2010-2013; green bars in Fig. 2). 2013-2016 population growth 
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110 continued to push emissions upward at the same pace as in the two previous 3-year periods 
111 (1.6%; blue bars in Fig. 2), and changes in the share of energy derived from natural gas and 
112 oil exerted a very small influence (+0.1% and -0.2%, respectively; yellow and purple bars in 
113 Fig. 2). Finally, the quality of fuels being burned in China declined over 2013-2016, 
114 contributing to a small decrease in overall emissions (1.0%; orange bar in Fig. 2). 
115 Fig. 3 reveals further details underlying the decreases due to changes in industrial 
116 structure, coal consumption, and energy intensity during 2013-2016. Fig. 3a highlights the 
117 shift in China’s industrial outputs over 2013-2016, away from energy- and emissions- 
118 intensive manufacturing towards higher value-added (e.g., high technology) manufacturing 
119 and services. Such high-technology manufacturing and services have been the main source of 
120 growth in the Chinese economy in recent years, accounting for 71.9% of total value added in 
121 2016, up from 64.4% in 2007. Service industries’ value added increased from 46.9% of 
122 national GDP in 2013 to 50.5% in 2015 and 51.6% in 2016, thus reaching its largest 
123 proportion of the Chinese economy since 1952. Meanwhile, output from China’s heavy 
124 industry has declined progressively, decreasing at an annual rate of 2.7% prior to 2013 and 
125 accelerating to an average annual decrease of 6.9% 2013-2016 8. 
126 Fig. 3b reveals the sectors that have accounted for the drop in Chinese coal consumption 
127 over 2013-2016. Whereas coal consumption in China grew by an average of 6.6% per year 
128 between 2007 and 2013, supporting a tremendous expansion of capital infrastructure, coal 
129 consumption peaked at 4.2 Gt in 2013 and declined by an average of 5.6% per year 2013- 
130 2016. The largest decreases in coal consumption occurred in the electricity sector, which 
131 accounted for 81.7% of the total reduction between 2013 and 2016 (pink bar in Fig. 3b). 
132 Other energy-related sectors, the coal washing and coking, together accounted for 21% 
133 (purple and green bars in Fig. 3B, respectively). 
134 Importantly, the reduction in coal consumption occurred despite continued growth of total 
135 energy consumption by 2.2%, 0.9% and 1.1% in 2014, 2015 and 2016, respectively (Fig. 1c). 
136 As coal use decreased, rising energy demand was met by rapid growth of renewable and 
137 nuclear energy, which increased at an average annual rate of 10.5% per year 2007-2013, and 
138 11% 2013-2016. Although increasing from a small base (8% of total energy consumed in 
139 2002), persistently high growth rates have led to non-fossil fuel energy supplying 13.3% of 
140 China’s energy in 2016. Meanwhile, coal’s share in the energy mix was essentially constant at 
141 ~68% 2007-2013, then dropping to 62% in 2016 (Fig. 1c). 
142 The structural trends in China’s economy have been reinforced by contemporaneous 
143 improvements in efficiency and thereby decreasing energy intensity. Fig. 3 shows some of the 
144 sectoral changes between 2013 and 2016. In particular, output from the metal products, 
145 coking, and chemical products sectors decreased while “other industries” (including the high 
146 technology and service industries) increased substantially (Fig. 3a). Also shown, the 
147 decreases in coal consumption over this timespan were largely in the electricity and coal 
148 washing sectors, with modest increases in consumption by the “other industries” and chemical 
149 products sectors (Fig. 3b). Finally, there were large decreases in energy per unit output of the 
150 “other industries”, cement, bricks, and glass, coal washing, and electricity sectors 2013-2016, 
151 offset to some extent by increases in the energy intensity of coking and metal products (Fig. 
152 3c). 
153 
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154 Maintenance of the lower emissions. After nearly two decades of rapidly rising emissions, 
155 a changing industrial structure, shifting energy mix, improving energy efficiency, and 
156 economic deceleration caused Chinese emissions to peak at 9.5 Gt CO2 in 2013 and decline 
157 by 4.2% in the years since. As the world’s top emitting and manufacturing nation, this 
158 reversal is cause for cautious optimism among those seeking to stabilize the Earth’s climate. 
159 Although some emissions inventories show the peak occurring a year earlier or later, 
160 sensitivity testing of our decomposition analysis shows the relative contributions of the 
161 different drivers are consistent and robust (Fig. 2). Now, the important question is whether the 
162 decline in Chinese emissions will persist. 
163 On the one hand, commentators have argued that the timetable of China’s peak emissions 
164 pledge was not very ambitious 9,10. For example, Green and Stern (2016) 11 argue “China’s 
165 international commitment to peak emissions ‘around 2030’ should be seen as a highly 
166 conservative upper limit from a government that prefers to under-promise and over-deliver.” 
167 But on the other hand, a 2013 peak is far sooner than anyone thought possible when Chinese 
168 President Xi Jinping first made the pledge in 2014. 
169 Moreover, history suggests caution is warranted in concluding that the reversal in 
170 emissions will hold over the long term: Although the shift towards services and away from 
171 more energy-intensive manufacturing is unambiguous 11, China’s economic growth has 
172 decelerated twice before. Most recently, after double digit growth from 1992-1996, China’s 
173 economy slowed during the East Asian economic crisis, when growth fell to an average of 8% 
174 for the four years 1998-2001 before accelerating again by the mid-2000s. Similarly rapid 
175 economic growth in the mid-1980s dropped dramatically to 4% between 1989 and 1991 
176 before accelerating again in the 1990s 12. Chinese emissions were essentially flat in 2016 (- 
177 0.4%), and—all other factors staying the same—a slight acceleration of economic growth 
178 (e.g., from 6.7% in 2015 to 7.1% in 2016) would have caused an increase in total emissions 
179 (in reality, the Chinese economy grew by 6.7% in 2016). 
180 The changes in China’s economic structure that have led to the recent decline are the result 
181 of consistent and strategic policies to improve industry structure 9,13,14, especially after 2010, 
182 which is consistent with previous studies15,16. More efforts have been made in recent years. 
183 From 2012 to 2015, China eliminated outdated capacity in 16 energy-intensive industries. For 
184 example, coal-fired power generation capacity declined by 21.1 GW (gigawatts), as well as 
185 reductions of 520 Mt (million tonnes) in coal production, 126 Mt in iron and steel processing 
186 and 500 Mt of cement 17. These structural changes have been reinforced by policies aimed at 
187 improving air quality and boosting deployment of low-carbon energy sources 18. For example, 
188 the Chinese government has strictly limited development of new coal-fired power plants since 
189 2013. Air quality policies have also encouraged more efficient use of coal, such as by phasing 
190 out older, smaller coal-fired power plants 18. 
191 However, recent progress in China, such as the retirement of small, old, and especially 
192 inefficient plants, offers a one-time decrease in emissions that is not easily repeated. The 
193 majority of coal-fired power plants now operating in China are large, modern power plants 
194 that have been built since the mid-1990s 19 and investments in coal-fired plant seem to have 
195 declined significantly from 2015 to 2017 20,21. Thus, further emissions reductions may 
196 increasingly depend on overcoming consider able infrastructural inertia by replacing valuable, 
197 young generators that burn coal with non-fossil electricity. Escaping carbon lock-in may 
198 therefore test the political will of China’s central government 22,23. 
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199 Nonetheless, government policies are a sign that the nascent decline in China’s emissions 
200 will continue. China’s seven local and regional pilot carbon market schemes will be replaced 
201 by a nationwide emissions trading scheme in 2018 24. China has also pledged to improve 
202 national energy intensity during 2015-2020 25, which will further translate to emissions 
203 reduction in coming years 25. Moreover, in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris 
204 Agreement, China has increasingly assumed a leadership role in climate change mitigation, 
205 and its five-year progress reports under the agreement will be heavily scrutinized by the rest 
206 of the world. 
207 Besides climate, energy security and public health goals will discourage coal consumption. 
208 Although China still produces almost 4 billion tons of coal a year (over three times that of the 
209 United States, the next largest producer), it also imports more coal than any other country, 
210 prompting concerns of energy independence and security 26. At the same time, rising incomes 
211 in major cities and concerns about the health impacts of poor air quality can be expected to 
212 close any remaining older coal-fired boilers and encourage a shift to natural gas, particularly 
213 in regions such as Southern and Eastern China that are both more affluent and more reliant on 
214 imported coal 27. 
215 Other policies cut in both directions. For example, the One Belt One Road policy 
216 emphasizes both public transport infrastructure and road transportation, and seeks to export 
217 coal technologies to neighbors such as Pakistan. As a result, growth in personal transportation 
218 could lead to large increases in emissions over the next decade (as evidenced by the growth in 
219 new and cheap produced SUV sales at recent low retailing prices)28. However, over the longer 
220 term, electric vehicles may avoid such emissions, assuming the availability of low-carbon 
221 electricity 29. 
222 China’s emissions may fluctuate in the coming years and that may mean that 2013 may not 
223 be the ‘final’ peak30. For example, extrapolating from data for the first six months of 2017, 
224 Jackson et al. argue that Chinese CO2 emissions (including cement) may rise for all of 2017 31. 
225 However, the changes in industrial activities, coal use, and efficiency that have caused the 
226 recent decline have roots in the changing structure of China’s economy and long-term 
227 government policies. The recent Chinese policy directive to cap coal at 4 billion metric tonnes 
228 per year requires its proportion in the energy mix to decrease from 64% in 2015 to around 
229 58% by 2020. Such pressures suggest that the downward trend in emissions could persist as 
230 China’s economy shifts from heavy and low-value manufacturing to high-technology and 
231 service industries. Both emissions and their underlying drivers will need to be carefully 
232 monitored, but the fact that China’s emissions have decreased for several years—and more 
233 importantly the reasons why—give hope for further decreases going forward. 
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318 Figure captions 
319 
320 
321 Figure 1. Temporal change of CO2 emissions and related indicators in China from 2000 to 2016. (a) Total 
322 carbon emissions from combustion of fossil fuels and cement production from different sources (EIA32 , IEA33 and 
323 BP 34 estimates exclude emissions from cement production); (b) GDP and CO2 emission intensity; (c) Total energy 
324 consumption by fuel; (d) Recursive cumulative sum plot of CO2 emissions from different sources. The recursive 
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325 cusum results for this study is the result of energy-related CO2 emissions. If the plot of the recursive cusum process 
326 crosses the confidence bands, indicating a significant structural break in that period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
327 
328 
329 Figure 2. Contribution of each driver to the change in national CO2 emissions in the periods 2007-2010, 
330 2010-2013 and 2013-2016. The length of the bar reflects the contribution of each factor per year. The error bar of 
331 each column is based on the range of the decomposition results of emissions from EIA, IEA and BP statistics. 
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332 
333 Figure 3. Sector-specific changes from 2013 to 2016 in China. (a) change in sectoral contribution to national 
334 GDP, (b) coal consumption and (c) energy intensity (energy per unit of output, unit: t/$). Different color bars 
335 represent the main contributing sectors. Percentage above each bar in (b) is the sectoral contribution to the total 
336 change in coal consumption from 2013 to 2016. 
337 
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339 Methods 
340 Emissions Estimates and Data Sources. The national CO2 emissions used in this study 
341 include two parts: energy-related emissions (emissions from fossil fuel combustion), and 
342 process-related emissions (emissions from cement industry processes). According to the IPCC 
343 guidelines7, energy-related CO2 emissions equals to activity data (fossil fuel consumption) 
344 multiplied by parameters NCV, EF , and O , see equation (1) below. 
345 
346 CEij  ADij  NCVi  EFi  Oij (1) 
 
347 In the equation, CEij refers to the CO2 emissions by energy type ( i i) and sector (j). The 
348 emissions are calculated by 17 different energy types (see Supplementary Table 1) and 47 
349 socioeconomic sectors (See Supplementary Table 2) in this study. 
350 ADij (activity data) means to fossil fuel consumption by the corresponding energy types 
351 and sectors. Energy loss during transportation, energy processes, and input as raw materials in 
352 chemical process are exclude from the consumption as these part of energy use will not emit 
353 any CO 35. All the data are collected from the most up-to-date energy balance tables and 
354 energy consumption by sectors published in Energy Statistical Yearbooks36. 
 
355 NCVi in equation (1) refers to net caloric value, which is the heat value produced per 
356 physical unit of fossil fuel combusted. EFi (emission factor) is the CO2 emissions per net 
357 caloric value produced for different fossil fuel types. Oij is oxygenation efficiency, which 
358 refers to the oxidation ratio when burning fossil fuels. We consider different oxygenation 
359 efficiencies for fossil fuels used in different sectors, as the combustion technology levels 
360 differ by sector in China. 
361 All three parameters are collected based on our previous survey of China’s fossil fuel 
362 quality37 and assumed to be unchanged throughout the study period35,38. The emission factors 
363 of coal-related fuels are approximately 40% lower than the IPCC default value, while the oil- 
364 and gas-related fuels’ emission factors are close to the IPCC values. The oxygenation 
365 efficiencies are calculated based on the different combustion levels of China’s industrial 
366 sectors. The average oxygenation efficiency for coal-related fuels is 92%, lower than the 
367 values of 100% and 98% used by UN and IPCC. CEADs also employs the latest energy 
368 consumption data adjusted by NBS in 2014. The data adjustment in 2014 brings a 5% 
369 increase to the total CO2 emissions. The parameters in this study are now being widely used 
370 by the Chinese government in its recently released report on climate change 39. 
371 We calculate the process-related CO2 emissions (cement production) in equation (2). CEt 
372 refers to CO2 emission from cement production in China. The activity data ( ADt ) refers to 
373 cement production, which are collected from China’s statistical yearbook 2001-20178. The 
374 emission factor for cement production ( EF ) is also collect from our previous research 37. 
 
375 
 
376 
CEt  ADt  EFt (2) 
377 Decomposition analysis. Decomposition analysis (DA) methods have been used 
378 extensively to quantify the contribution of socioeconomic drivers to change in environmental 
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379 pressures 6,43-44. Two decomposition approaches are by far the most popular, namely, index 
380 decomposition analysis (IDA) and structural decomposition analysis (SDA). Compared with 
381 SDA, which is based on input–output coefficients and final demands from input–output 
382 tables, IDA is more suitable for time-series analysis using data with sufficient temporal and 
383 sectoral detail 45,46. The advantage of the IDA approach is that it can be easily applied to any 
384 data at any level of aggregation 47. 
385 Among specific IDA methodologies, the Logarithmic Mean Divisia Index (LMDI) has 
386 been shown by past studies to be preferable by virtue of its path independence, consistency in 
387 aggregation, and ability to handle zero values 48-50. As a result, many studies have used LMDI 
388 to provide policy-relevant insights, for instance by identifying driving forces of energy 
389 consumption 47,51,52 and changes in CO2 emissions 53-56. The LMDI analysis compares a set of 
390 indices between the base and final year of a given period, and explores the effects of these 
391 indices on the trend of emissions over that period 47. See supplementary information for 
392 detailed calculation. 
393 In this study, we decompose the national energy-related industrial CO2 emissions (C) as: 
 
394 C  C   P  
G 
 
G
j 
 
E 
j 
 
E
ij 
 
C
ij 
  P Y  S  I  M T 
    
 
(3) 
ij 
i j i j P G Gj E j Eij i j 
j j ij ij 
 
395 where C represents national energy-related industrial CO2 emissions, Cij is the CO2 
396 emissions in sector j (where sector j=1,2,3,4 represents light industries, heavy industries, high 
397 technology industries and agricultural & service industries, see Supplementary Table 2 for 
398 sector definition) by fuel type i (where i=1,2,3 represents coal, oil, and natural gas, 
399 respectively), Gj is Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of sector j，Eij is the consumption of fuel 
400 type i in sector j; Thus, according to equation (1), C is represented by six factors mentioned 
401 above: 
 
402 1）P is population； 
403 2） Y  G /P stands for GDP per capita and measures economic growth; 
404 3) S j  Gi / G is the sector j’s share of total GDP, represents the industrial structure; 
405 4) I j  Ej / Gj is energy intensity in sector j and measures the energy consumption per 
406 unit of GDP, which indicates the energy efficiency; 
407 5) Mij  Eij /E j is the proportion of fuel type i in sector j and represents the energy mix 
408 effect, M1, M2 and M3 in equation (4) describe the proportion of coal, oil and natural gas in the 
409 entire economy. The effect of non-fossil energy proportion is assessed to be zero. 
410 6) Tij  Cij / Eij is the emission intensity of fuel type i in sector j, reflecting changes of 
411 fuel carbon content upgrades (e.g. replacing brown coal by anthracite) within any broad fuel 
412 type (i.e. coal consumption). 17 types of fossil fuel are included in this study (Supplementary 
413 Table 1), which is aggregated into three categories (coal, oil and gas). 
414 Thus, the change of national CO2 emissions in year t compared with the year t-1 is 
415 calculated as 
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417 
 
Here, L(w
t 
, w
t 1 
)  (C
t 
 C
t 1 
) / (ln(C
t 
)  ln(C
t 1 
)) , is a weighting factor called the 
418 logarithmic mean weight. CP , CY , CS , CI , Ccoal , Coil , Cgas and CT , are 
419 CO2 emission changes owing to population variation, economic growth, industrial structure 
420 adjustment, energy intensity effect, changes in the proportion of coal, oil, and natural gas 
421 consumption, and emission intensity change, respectively. The decomposition analysis with 
422 CO2 emissions estimated in this study is defined as the base decomposition. 
423 
424 Sensitivity Test. To assess the extent to which different factors’ contributions are affected by 
425 national CO2 emissions, we conduct a sensitivity analysis which decomposes the emissions 
426 from the BP，IEA and EIA databases (Fig.1a). CO2 emissions from other data source are 
427 obtained from Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Centre (CDIAC)1; Emissions 
428 Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR)41; United Nations Framework 
429 Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)1,42; U.S. Energy Information Administration 
430 (EIA)32, International Energy Agency (IEA)33 and British Petroleum (BP)34.The national 
431 fossil fuel emissions for the different data sources are given by CBP, CIEA and CEIA 
432 respectively. Then they were split into different fuel types in different sectors (Cij) with the 
433 share (Cij/C) in the base decomposition. The decomposition 1(CBP), decomposition 2 (CEIA) 
434 and decomposition 3 (CIEA) are conducted with the same Eij , Ej and P in the base 
435 decomposition. The range of results of decompositions 1, 2 and 3 are shown as error bars in 
436 Fig.2. 
437 Cumulative sum (cusum) test. We use an econometric approach to investigate whether a 
438 structural break of energy- related carbon emissions had occurred in the industrial sector over 
439 2000-2016. The occurrence of structural break is examined using the cumulative sum (cusum) 
440 test introduced by Brown et al.57 and Ploberger and Krämer 58 
 
441  
442 We model the total energy-related CO2 emissions as a function of its first-order lag as 
443 follows: 
444 𝐶𝐶2𝐶 = 𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶2𝐶−1 + 𝐶𝐶 𝐶 = 1, … , 𝐶 (3) 
 
445 Where 𝐶𝐶 is a vector of time-varying parameters and 𝐶𝐶 is an independent and identically 
446 normally distributed error term. The null hypothesis for the test of parameter stability is H0: 
447 𝐶𝐶 = 𝐶, which is interpreted as the parameter 𝐶 is constant over time. Under the null 
448 hypothesis, the recursive residuals are assumed to be independent and identically distributed 
449 as N(0, 3 ), and the cumulative sum of the recursive residuals also has a mean of zero. The 
450 formula for the cumulative sum of the recursive residuals can be found in Brown et al.57. 
2 2 
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451 The null hypothesis can be rejected if the cusum statistic is larger than a critical value at 
452 90%, 95%, or 99%. Once the null hypothesis is rejected, it implies that there exists a 
453 structural break during this period. 
454 
455 Data availability. The original data that support the findings of this study can be freely downloaded 
456 from the China Emission Accounts and Datasets (CEADS) website (http://www.ceads.net/). The data 
457 descriptor has been published on Scientific data to facilitate reuse 40. 
 
458 
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